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NOTE
Private Actors and Public Corruption:
Why Courts Should Adopt a Broad Interpretation
of the Hobbs Act
Megan DeMarco*
Federal prosecutors routinely charge public officials with “extortion under
color of official right” under a public-corruption statute called the Hobbs Act.
To be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act, a public official must promise official
action in return for a bribe or kickback. The public official, however, does not
need to have actual authority over that official action. As long as the victim
reasonably believed that the public official could deliver or influence govern-
ment action, the public official violated the Hobbs Act. Private citizens also
solicit bribes in return for influencing official action. Yet most courts do not
think the Hobbs Act applies to private citizens, even those who also create and
exploit a belief that they have the ability to influence official action. This Note
argues that interpreting “extortion under color of official right” to exclude
private actors is incorrect. The test for anyone acting under color of official
right should be whether the victim reasonably believes that person can influ-
ence official action.
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Introduction
In 2001, Monte D. McFall, a lobbyist and former public official, worked
to raise money and political support for a friend running for public office in
California.1 Thanks in part to McFall and his associates, the friend, Lynn
Bedford, won the vacant county supervisor seat.2 Shortly after Bedford’s ap-
pointment, McFall and his partners formed two entities to maximize their
financial interests through Bedford, including SMTM Partners, LP—short
for “Show Me The Money.”3
As soon as Bedford was appointed to the seat, McFall started telling
people that he was Bedford’s proxy.4 In 2001, McFall contacted an attorney
who represented a development company and invited him to a fundraiser
for Bedford.5 Bedford, McFall, and the developer met a few weeks later, and
Bedford indicated that McFall could help the developer secure the necessary
permits for his project.6 Later, McFall told the developer that he could de-
liver Bedford’s vote if the developer paid McFall between $50,000 and
$100,000.7
As a result, prosecutors charged McFall with attempted “extortion under
color of official right” under a public-corruption statute known as the
Hobbs Act.8 McFall proceeded to trial, was convicted, and received a sen-
tence of 121 months in prison.9 On appeal, McFall argued that he was im-
properly convicted because as a private citizen, not a public official, he could
not act under color of official right without aiding and abetting a public
official.10 The Ninth Circuit reversed the Hobbs Act conviction. Because Mc-
Fall himself was not a public official, the court reasoned, he could be held
liable only if he acted in concert with a public official.11 On re-sentencing for
1. United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 953–54.
4. Id. at 953.




9. Id. at 954.
10. Id. at 958–59.
11. Id. at 960.
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other charges, McFall received 78 months, a significant decrease from his
original sentence of 121 months.12
This scenario is all too common. Private citizens act under the guise of
official authority and solicit payouts in return for the delivery of official
action. Yet they escape extortion charges because most federal courts apply
the requisite extortion statute, the Hobbs Act, only to public officials.13
These courts exclude private citizens who, like McFall, use their corrupt in-
fluence over official actions to solicit bribes from victims.14
In the context of the Hobbs Act, courts have interpreted extortion to be,
essentially, what most people think of as bribery.15 The legal difference be-
tween extortion and bribery is the culpability of the parties.16 In bribery
cases, both the person who receives the bribe and the person who pays it are
criminally culpable.17 By way of contrast, in extortion cases the person who
pays is considered instead a victim coerced by the extortioner, so only the
person who receives the bribe is legally culpable.18 There is a federal bribery
statute,19 but it applies only to corruption by federal officials,20 whereas the
Hobbs Act applies to state and local officials.
In Hobbs Act cases, the phrase “under color of official right” is notori-
ously ambiguous, and courts disagree on its meaning.21 Many courts find
that only a public official can act under color of official right.22 Other courts
find that the Act reaches beyond officials to include public employees.23
12. Amended Judgment at 3, United States v. McFall, No. 2:02CR00468-001 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 2, 2009).
13. See infra notes 74–92 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 74–92 and accompanying text.
15. James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 817–18 (1988) (“[S]ince the early 1970s,
extortion has been held to include behavior that most people would think of as bribery.”).
16. J. Kelly Strader, Understanding White Collar Crime 191 (3d ed. 2011).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
20. See id. (defining “public officials” as those “acting for or on behalf of the United
States”).
21. United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[C]ourts have grappled with
ambiguity embedded in the text of the Hobbs Act, and in particular, the ‘under color of
official right’ language.”); see also United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Remarkably, there appears to be no source for the undisputed meaning of the term ‘under
color of official right.’ ”); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1383 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The
plain meaning of the statute does not clearly indicate who can act under color of official right
. . . .”).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Rashad, 687 F.3d 637, 642 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[O]nly public
officials are charged with extorting property under color of official right.”); see also United
States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[A]s a general matter and with caveats
as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on an ‘official right’ theory is inappropri-
ate under the literal and historical meaning of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual ‘con-
trol’ that citizen purports to maintain over governmental activity.”).
23. See infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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Some find private citizens liable under accomplice liability.24 And finally, a
handful of district courts have upheld convictions for private citizens
charged with extortion under color of official right,25 including an explicit
endorsement of applying the Act to private citizens in United States v. Phil-
lips, a Northern District of Illinois case.26 In 2011, the Third Circuit called
the question of Hobbs Act applicability to private actors a “significant and
novel question.”27 The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed this
issue.
Although disagreement exists, the large majority of courts interpret the
Hobbs Act to apply only to public officials. Prosecutors started using the
Hobbs Act to target public corruption in 1972.28 Since then, federal courts
have overturned convictions of or dismissed charges against a number of
different kinds of private actors: private attorneys who solicited bribes from
their clients to influence public officials;29 a businessman who took a
$250,000 loan in return for influencing a U.S. Senator’s office;30 and candi-
dates for office who took a $27,500 bribe in return for official actions once
elected.31 In all of these cases, courts dismissed the charges or overturned the
convictions because the defendants, private citizens, were not acting under
color of official right.
By way of contrast, a public official may be liable under the Hobbs Act if
she accepts a bribe in return for official action, even if she has no authority
over that action.32 This principle stems from United States v. Mazzei, a semi-
nal Third Circuit case.33 For example, the Third Circuit recently upheld the
conviction of a New Jersey mayor who accepted a bribe to influence a school
board contract—an action that, as the mayor, he lacked the authority to
24. See infra notes 103–109 and accompanying text.
25. E.g., United States v. Lena, 497 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (“One who is
not himself a public official may extort money under color of official right if he purports to
exercise influence over those who are public officials.”), aff’d, 649 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1981)
(unpublished table decision).
26. 586 F. Supp. 1118, 1122–23 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
27. United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 2011).
28. Peter J. Henning & Lee J. Radek, The Prosecution and Defense of Public
Corruption 7–8 (2011).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 674–76 (6th Cir. 2005) (conviction
reversed); United States v. Gonzales, 620 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (charges dis-
missed); United States v. Freedman, 562 F. Supp. 1378, 1384–87 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (charges
dismissed).
30. United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1382–83 (5th Cir. 1995) (conviction
reversed).
31. Manzo, 636 F.3d at 59–61 (charges dismissed); see also United States v. Abbas, 560
F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that applying a sentencing enhancement for color of official
right was harmless error for a private citizen who masqueraded as a public official); United
States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1991) (dictum) (deciding that it is inappropriate
to charge a private citizen who influenced a city contract with extortion under official right).
32. See infra Section III.A.
33. 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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take.34 Under the Mazzei principle, however, as long as the victim believes
the public official has the ability to influence the action, the public official
has committed extortion under color of official right.
Thus, when evaluating prosecutions of public officials, courts look to
the victim’s perception; yet when evaluating prosecutions of private citizens,
courts do not consider whether the victim believed that the private citizen
had the ability to influence official action.35 This Note contends that the
Mazzei reasonable-impression test should inform all color-of-official-right
cases, regardless of the defendant’s actual authority.
This more expansive test is appropriate because anyone who contributes
to the problem of public corruption, whether public official or private citi-
zen, should be penalized. Public corruption is “one of the most serious of-
fenses in any organized political system.”36 It continues to infect government
at high levels. Federal prosecutors have, for example, convicted the mayor of
Detroit37 and several state-level officials in New York.38
Specifically, public corruption undermines the public’s faith in its
elected officials.39 And, according to Attorney General Loretta Lynch, cor-
ruption disproportionately affects poor communities and minorities. When
Lynch was a U.S. Attorney, she noted that convicted public officials often
represent constituents from historically underrepresented communities,
“who place their faith in their elected officials.”40 When private citizens cre-
ate the belief that they can influence official action, victims of extortion
believe official results are for sale. Whether grounded in truth or not, this
belief undermines faith in government.
This Note argues that the Hobbs Act applies to extortion by private citi-
zens acting under the guise of official authority. Courts should address this
problem by applying a “reasonable impression” test—that is, a test that asks
whether the extortioner created and exploited the reasonable impression
that she had the ability to influence an official action—regardless of her
status as a public official or her actual authority. Part I traces the problem of
34. United States v. Bencivengo, 749 F.3d 205, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 236 (2014).
35. See infra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
36. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 2.
37. Press Release, FBI, Former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, Contractor Bobby Fer-
guson, and Bernard Kilpatrick Sentenced on Racketeering, Extortion, Bribery, Fraud, and Tax
Charges (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/detroit/press-releases/2013/former-detroit-mayor-
kwame-kilpatrick-contractor-bobby-ferguson-and-bernard-kilpatrick-sentenced-on-racketeer-
ing-extortion-bribery-fraud-and-tax-charges [http://perma.cc/U9LM-JUGS].
38. Testimony of Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att’y for the E.D.N.Y., Moreland Commission
Public Hearing (Sept. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Lynch testimony].
39. See, e.g., Patrick Fitzgerald, Combating Corruption: Keynote Address November 5,
2011, 2012 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 4 (2012) (noting that the “priceless cost” of public corruption
is “loss of trust in government”); Lynch testimony, supra note 38, at 7 (noting that public
corruption cases “increase the level of cynicism and distrust of our elected officials—weaken-
ing our faith in the political system”).
40. Lynch testimony, supra note 38, at 3.
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private actors escaping punishment for acts of extortion. Part II asserts that
the text of the Hobbs Act suggests that both public officials and private citi-
zens can act under color of official right. Part III argues that the reasonable-
impression test currently applied to public officials should extend to private
citizens as well, because private citizens also undermine the public’s faith in
government.
I. Private Actors Escape Hobbs Act Convictions for Extortion
Under Color of Official Right
The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to affect interstate commerce through
the use of fear or “under color of official right.”41 The text reads as follows:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extor-
tion or attempts or conspires so to do . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. . . . The term “extortion”
means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right.42
Prosecutors generally charge Hobbs Act cases under one of the two
prongs of the statute: extortion by fear or extortion under color of official
right.43 For the purposes of this Note, “the Hobbs Act” refers to the color-of-
official-right prong of the statute unless otherwise noted.
This Part addresses the development of courts’ Hobbs Act jurispru-
dence, specifically how courts have treated private citizens who prosecutors
have charged with extortion under color of official right. Section I.A traces
the development of the Hobbs Act as a tool for federal prosecutors fighting
public corruption. Section I.B discusses how courts have approached cases
involving private citizens charged with official-right extortion.
A. The Development of the Hobbs Act as a Public-Corruption Statute
Congress passed the Hobbs Act in 1946 as a successor to the Anti-Rack-
eteering Act of 1934.44 Prosecutors did not use it to prosecute public corrup-
tion until the 1970s.45 In 1970, federal prosecutors in New Jersey charged
several Jersey City officials with a scheme that involved extorting kickbacks
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).
42. Id. §§ 1951(a), (b)(2).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he statute
supports two classes of extortion: extortion induced by ‘wrongful use of force’ and extortion
‘under color of official right.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir.
2001)); Strader, supra note 16, at 191.
44. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 107; see also infra notes 136–146 and accompa-
nying text (discussing history of the Hobbs Act).
45. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 8.
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from contractors.46 Several of the city officials were convicted.47 The case
inspired prosecutors across the country to start charging the Hobbs Act—
federal prosecutors in New York, Baltimore, Chicago, Philadelphia, and
Pittsburgh soon followed Newark’s lead.48 By the mid-1970s, federal prose-
cutors were pursuing Hobbs Act convictions against more than 300 state
officials a year.49
Today, the Hobbs Act is one of the statutes prosecutors most frequently
use to combat public corruption.50 Since there is no comprehensive federal
law that addresses public corruption,51 federal prosecutors use a combina-
tion of different federal statutes,52 including the Hobbs Act, the Travel Act,53
the mail-fraud statute,54 the federal bribery statute,55 and the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.56 Among these statutes, prosecu-
tors consider the Hobbs Act one of the primary weapons for prosecuting
bribery by state and local officials.57
Prosecutors prefer the Hobbs Act for several reasons. First, it reaches
state and local officials,58 whereas the federal bribery statute only applies to
46. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1216–17 (3d Cir. 1972). John Kenny, the
leader of the Jersey City officials, was a mentee of legendary Jersey City political boss, Mayor
Frank Hague. John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes 584 (1984).
47. Noonan, supra note 46, at 585–87 (“The main instrument of his machine’s downfall
had been the Hobbs Act.”). Notably, Kenny, who started the entire line of under-color-of-
official-right cases, was not himself a public official. He “held no public office or official party
position in the years in question,” yet “was de facto the absolute boss of the political party in
power.” Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1211. The Third Circuit noted that Kenny “ruled the political life
of both city and county,” while every other defendant held a position in city or county govern-
ment. Id. at 1216–17. Kenny determined who would hold office and organized a system of
collecting kickbacks in return for government action. Id. at 1217. Kenny, whose health was
failing, pleaded guilty to tax evasion and was never actually convicted of the Hobbs Act charge,
so the issue was not raised. Noonan, supra note 46, at 585.
48. Noonan, supra note 46, at 587.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Strader, supra note 16, at 171 (noting that the Hobbs Act and the federal
bribery statute are the “primary means” for targeting government corruption); Analysis: What
Is the Hobbs Act and How Does It Apply to the McDonnell Case?, WAMU 88.5 (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://wamu.org/news/14/01/22/analysis_what_is_the_hobbes_act_and_how_does_it_apply_
to_the_mcdonnell_case [http://perma.cc/2W9P-9U42] (noting that the Hobbs Act and honest
services mail and wire fraud are the “two most common vehicles for federal prosecution of
state or local officials in corruption cases”).
51. George D. Brown, Stealth Statute—Corruption, the Spending Power, and the Rise of 18
U.S.C. § 666, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 247, 254 (1998).
52. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 3 (“[F]ederal corruption law is at best a
hodgepodge.”); Brown, supra note 51, at 254.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012).
54. Id. § 1341.
55. Id. § 201.
56. Id. § 1962.
57. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 8.
58. Id.
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federal officials.59 Second, it is easier for prosecutors to meet the elements of
the Hobbs Act than the elements of other corruption statutes. For example,
the Travel Act requires travel in interstate commerce,60 while the Hobbs Act
only requires a slight effect on interstate commerce.61 Third, the Hobbs Act
carries higher penalties than other statutes. The Hobbs Act carries a twenty-
year maximum penalty.62 The federal bribery statute carries a fifteen-year
maximum,63 and the Travel Act carries five years for nonviolent acts.64 As
one commentator notes, prosecuting corruption under the Hobbs Act has
“several advantages from the standpoint of federal prosecutors, not the least
of which was a severe twenty-year maximum punishment.”65
B. The Supreme Court’s Approach
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the applicability of the
official-right prong of the Hobbs Act to private citizens. But, the Court has
briefly acknowledged that the question is open.66 In Evans v. United States,
the Court held that the Hobbs Act does not require the extortioner to af-
firmatively induce a bribe.67 The government only needs to prove that “a
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, know-
ing that the payment was made in return for official acts.”68 The Court
adopted the definition of extortion at common law, writing that “a statutory
term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning.”69 In a foot-
note, the Court recognized that “[a]t least one commentator has argued
that, at common law, extortion under color of official right could also be
committed by a private individual,”70 citing an article by Professor James
Lindgren.71 Thus, the Court acknowledged, albeit only once and in a foot-
note, that the common-law definition might encompass a private individual
committing extortion under color of official right.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 201.
60. Id. § 1952.
61. Herbert J. Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The
Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 9 (1971); see
also Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 905 n.62 (2005)
(“A further advantage of using the Hobbs Act is that the required jurisdictional nexus is
broader than those specified by other federal statutes applicable to such bribery.”).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
63. Id. § 201(b).
64. Id. § 1952(a)(3)(A).
65. Smith, supra note 61, at 905.
66. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 264 n.13 (1992).
67. Id. at 268.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 259 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)).
70. Id. at 264 n.13.
71. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 876.
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C. Other Courts’ Approaches to Extortionate Acts by Private Actors
Even after Evans, the widely held belief among federal courts remains
that only public officials may commit official-right extortion, although pri-
vate citizens may be charged under an aiding-and-abetting theory. This ap-
proach allows three types of private actors to extort bribes without
conspiring with a public official: those who take a bribe in return for a
promise to exercise influence over public officials or official action; those
who masquerade as public officials; and those who previously held public
office or hope to hold public office in the future, but accept a payment while
a private citizen. Courts have used three main arguments to support the
assertion that only public officials can be charged with official-right extor-
tion. First, and most importantly, the statute reflects the common-law
meaning of extortion. Courts and scholars widely believe that at common
law, only public officials could commit extortion. Second, the act of holding
public office provides an element of coercion that parallels the coercive ele-
ment of extortion by fear or violence in the other prong of the statute. And
third, public officials are more culpable simply because they are abusing the
public trust. This Subsection describes each of these arguments and then
considers cases in which courts have upheld convictions for private citizens
under different legal theories.
In Evans, the Supreme Court wrote that language in the Hobbs Act re-
flects the common-law understanding of the word extortion.72 The Court
described the common-law understanding of extortion as “an offense com-
mitted by a public official who took ‘by colour of his office’ money that was
not due to him for the performance of his official duties.”73 Post-Evans
courts have relied on this language when analyzing Hobbs Act cases involv-
ing private citizens.
The Fifth, Third, and Seventh Circuits have rested on this line of statu-
tory interpretation. In United States v. Tomblin, for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit overturned the conviction of a private businessman who solicited a
$250,000 loan in return for exercising influence over a U.S. Senator.74 The
court ruled that “Congress preserved the common law definition of extor-
tion, under which extortion could only be committed by a public official.”75
Likewise, the Seventh76 and Third77 Circuits relied on the Evans Court’s
statement that extortion mirrors the common-law definition. In United
States v. Manzo, the Third Circuit considered a candidate for office and his
72. Evans, 504 U.S. at 263–64.
73. Id. at 260 (footnote omitted). The Court relied on Blackstone, who defined extortion
as “an abuse of public justice, which consists in an officer’s unlawfully taking, by colour of his
office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than is due,
or before it is due.” Id. at 260 n.4.
74. 46 F.3d 1369, 1375, 1386 (5th Cir. 1995).
75. Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1383 (footnote omitted).
76. United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2009).
77. United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2011).
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brother, who solicited $27,500 from a developer (actually an FBI informant)
to steer a contract and promote a certain city employee once the candidate
was in office.78 Because Manzo lost the election, federal prosecutors charged
him with conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right.79 The
court held that the Manzos were not acting under color of official right
because, “[a]t common law, the phrase ‘extortion under color of official
right’ was a legal term of art that encompassed only the actions of public
officials.”80
Courts also reject Hobbs Act liability for private citizens because they
believe that holding public office amounts to coercion. This line of reason-
ing allows the color-of-official-right prong of the Hobbs Act to parallel the
“fear of harm” prong of the statute. In Tomblin, the Fifth Circuit explained
that “the official’s position provides the coercive element that the threats
and fear of the other ground supply.”81 In Manzo, the Third Circuit wrote
that Congress intended to criminalize only coercive exchanges,82 and the
misuse of public office constitutes the coercion in color-of-official-right
cases.83 The “essence of the offense was the abuse of the public trust that
inhered in the office.”84 In United States v. McClain, the Seventh Circuit
noted that Congress intended to set off “under color of official right” from
the other prong of the statute because private citizens just do not have the
same power.85 To extort, a private person would generally need to use threats
or intend to injure.86 “In private person cases, therefore, prosecution under
the fear prong is available, and the government may not ordinarily have a
basis for resorting to the ‘official right’ theory.”87 Similarly, the Northern
District of Illinois held, “[t]he coercion leading to the extortion must flow
from perceived official power.”88
The third reason courts limit Hobbs Act prosecutions to public officials
is that public officials are more culpable because they are abusing the public
trust. Only a few courts have rested on this reasoning. In United States v.
Abbas, the Seventh Circuit wrote that “what makes extortion under color of
official right so pernicious is that the state . . . has given the offender the
power to harm his victims.”89 For that reason, such an offender should be
78. Id. at 59–60.
79. Id. at 60–61.
80. Id. at 62, 68–69.
81. United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1383 (5th Cir. 1995).
82. Manzo, 636 F.3d at 65.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 62 (quoting United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 650 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting)).
85. 934 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1991).
86. McClain, 934 F.2d at 830.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Gonzales, 620 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
89. 560 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2009).
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singled out for a “special brand of criminal liability.”90 The court acknowl-
edged that private citizens pretending to be public officials can cause just as
much harm as an extortioner who is in fact a public official.91 But crimes
with “identical effects” can be punished differently, based on the intent and
manner of the crime.92
Because many courts emphasize official authority in these cases, they
largely ignore the victim’s perception of the extortioner’s ability to influence
official action. The Tomblin court, for example, overturned the defendant’s
Hobbs Act conviction because the defendant’s authority “was not official
power; it was unofficial power over an official.”93 The court did not consider
whether, despite the defendant’s only wielding unofficial power, the victim
believed the defendant could deliver official action.94 In McClain, prosecu-
tors charged a private individual with official-right extortion after he took a
bribe from a company competing for a city contract in Chicago.95 The de-
fendant “boasted colorfully of the power he wielded over city contract
awards.”96 Yet the court concluded that it is generally inappropriate to
charge private individuals with extortion under color of official right, “irre-
spective of the actual ‘control’ that citizen purports to maintain over govern-
mental activity.”97 Finally, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. McFall
overturned McFall’s conviction because “McFall himself made no claim of
official right.”98 Though he claimed to have “outsized political influence,” he
never represented himself as a public official so could not be convicted with-
out a jury instruction on aiding and abetting.99
Courts employ these three arguments when considering private citizens
who are government employees, though not officials. For example, in United
States v. Freeman, the Ninth Circuit extended the Hobbs Act to a California
state legislative aide who accepted $6,500 to shepherd a bill through the state
legislature.100 Although the legislative aide was unelected and unappointed,
the court held the Hobbs Act covered his conduct because it “reaches anyone
90. Abbas, 560 F.3d at 664.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1383 (5th Cir. 1995).
94. See id.
95. United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1991).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 831.
98. United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).
99. Id. at 959–60.
100. 6 F.3d 586, 593–94 (9th Cir. 1993).
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who actually exercises official powers.”101 Similarly, the Middle District of
Louisiana upheld the conviction of an unelected aide to the governor.102
Similarly, the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have upheld offi-
cial-right extortion convictions for private citizens under an accomplice-lia-
bility theory.103 The Fifth Circuit, for example, ruled that a private-citizen
defendant’s participation in an agreement with public officials “suffices to
establish conspiratorial guilt.”104 Likewise, the Second Circuit held that a pri-
vate citizen, the chairman of the local Republican Committee, caused the
public official to commit the extortion.105 “[A]n individual with the requisite
criminal intent may be held liable as a principal if he is a cause in fact in the
commission of a crime, notwithstanding that the proscribed conduct is
achieved through the actions of innocent intermediaries.”106
The Seventh Circuit also upheld the convictions of two private citizens
for conspiring to extort under color of official right. In United States v. Mey-
ers, two candidates for office took $6,000 in bribes in return for the promise
of future action.107 Since they won the election, the conspiracy continued
into the period when they were actually in office.108 The court wrote, “it is
no less of a crime under the Hobbs Act to sell one’s public trust before,
rather than after, one is installed in public office.”109
A handful of district courts have fully extended the Hobbs Act to private
citizens, even if they did not conspire with or aid and abet public officials.
For example, the Western District of Pennsylvania upheld the conviction of
a school board member, even though he accepted payments when he was no
101. Freeman, 6 F.3d at 593; see also United States v. Casiano, No. 93-1782, 1994 WL
283909, at *4 (1st Cir. June 24, 1994) (per curiam) (“[O]ne need not be an elected or ap-
pointed public official even to be convicted as a principal under the Hobbs Act’s ‘color of
official right’ provision.”).
102. United States v. Ray, 690 F. Supp. 508, 512 (M.D. La. 1988) (“[T]he Act itself appears
to reach anyone who in fact exercises official rights or functions, regardless of whether those
powers were conferred by reason of his being elected or appointed to an office . . . .”).
103. United States v. Rashad, 687 F.3d 637, 643 (5th Cir. 2012); Casiano, 1994 WL 283909
at *4; United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1279 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Margiotta,
688 F.2d 108, 131 (2d Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d
610 (2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 673, 675–76 (6th Cir. 2005)
(reversing conviction for private individual who solicited $16,000 to fix a criminal case be-
cause, “[i]n this circuit, a private citizen who is not in the process of becoming a public official
may be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion under the ‘color of official right’ theory only if that
private citizen either conspires with, or aids and abets, a public official”).
104. Rashad, 687 F.3d at 643.
105. Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 112, 131.
106. Id. at 131.
107. 529 F.2d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 1976).
108. Meyers, 529 F.2d at 1036.
109. Id. at 1038. The government in the candidates’ case from the Third Circuit, see supra
notes 78–80 and accompanying text, tried to rely on Meyers. The Third Circuit rejected that
argument because the defendants in Manzo lost their election. United States v. Manzo, 636
F.3d 56, 68–69 (3d Cir. 2011).
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longer in office.110 The court held it was “immaterial” that he was no longer
in office because “[o]ne who is not himself a public official may extort
money under color of official right if he purports to exercise influence over
those who are public officials.”111 Similarly, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania upheld the conviction of a former tax assessor who accepted pay-
ments after he had left office.112 In the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
defendants challenged an indictment because the government had failed to
prove they were members of a school board.113 The court deemed this fact
immaterial, effectively endorsing application of official-right extortion to
private citizens.114
The Northern District of Illinois has provided the most explicit en-
dorsement of applying the Hobbs Act to private citizens who have never
been public officials, are not planning to be public officials, and are not
conspiring with public officials. In United States v. Phillips, the court upheld
the indictment of a private attorney for attempted extortion under color of
official right after examining the text, legislative history, and intent of the
Hobbs Act.115 These examples show that courts’ approaches vary widely and
lack consistency, both in their holdings and their rationales.
II. The Hobbs Act Should Apply to Private Citizens
This Part argues that as a matter of statutory interpretation, private ac-
tors can commit extortion under color of official right. Section II.A argues
that the text of the statute—both its contemporary and common-law mean-
ings—supports the application of the Act to private actors under an official-
right theory. Section II.B contends that the legislative history further sup-
ports this application. Section II.C argues that lower courts should follow
the Supreme Court’s mandate to interpret the Hobbs Act broadly.
A. The Text of the Hobbs Act Supports a Broad Reading
Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute.116 There is no
definition of “under color of official right” in the Hobbs Act,117 and courts
110. United States v. Lena, 497 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 861
(3d Cir. 1981).
111. Id.
112. United States v. Furey, 491 F. Supp. 1048, 1064, 1068 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 636 F.2d
1211 (3d Cir. 1980).
113. United States v. Barna, 442 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 578 F.2d 1376
(3d Cir. 1978).
114. Id.
115. 586 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also infra notes 188–197 and accompa-
nying text.
116. E.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127 (1998) (“We begin with the stat-
ute’s language.”); see, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 697 (1995).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“The Hobbs Act does not define ‘under color of official right.’ ”).
426 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:413
have struggled to define the phrase. Because the statute leaves so much to
interpretation, courts vary in how they interpret it. For example, some
courts hold that the “fear” prong of the Hobbs Act applies to private citi-
zens, while the “official right” prong applies to public officials.118 The text of
the statute, however, does not identify certain classes of individuals who can
only be convicted under certain prongs of the Act.
When a statute does not define a term, generally that term is given its
ordinary meaning.119 The ordinary meaning of “under color of official right”
might suggest either a guise or appearance of authority, or actual, vested
authority. One means of interpreting vague statutory language is to consult
a dictionary.120 Black’s Law Dictionary suggests that “under color of official
right” means the appearance of official power—not actual power. The defi-
nition of “color” is “appearance, guise, or semblance; esp., the appearance of
a legal claim to a right, authority, or office.”121 Specifically, “[a]cts taken
under the color of an office are vested with, or appear to be vested with, the
authority entrusted to that office.”122 Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s defines
“color” as “a legal claim to or appearance of a right, authority, or office.”123
The “under color” language encompasses those who act under the guise of
official right—suggesting that actually holding the authority of an office is
not necessary under the Act. Indeed, at least one court has relied on this
argument to find that a private individual committed extortion under color
of official right.124
Interpreting “under color of official right” to mean “under the appear-
ance of official authority” is entirely consistent with the Evans Court’s inter-
pretation: that the drafters of the Hobbs Act intended the term “extortion”
to reflect its common-law meaning.125 To be sure, commentators and courts
have written that only public officials could commit extortion at common
law.126 But one scholar, Professor Lindgren, has argued that private citizens
118. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 829–30 (7th Cir. 1991); see also
Randy J. Curato et al., Note, Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting
Official Corruption, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027, 1058 (1983) (“For purposes of extortion by
fear, the Hobbs Act does not require status as a public official. Extortion under color of official
right, however, presupposes some public trust position.”).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511 (2008).
120. See, e.g., id. at 511; Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128; Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697; Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1993).
121. Color, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
122. Id., color of office (emphasis added).
123. Color, Merriam-Webster, http:// www . merriam - webster . com / dictionary / color
[http://perma.cc/BX4X-8XTC].
124. United States v. Phillips, 586 F. Supp. 1118, 1120–22 (N.D. Ill. 1984). In Phillips, the
court held that “under color of” suggested a disguise or pretext of authority, and wrote that
the statute applies “not only to actual public officials but also to any person purporting to
wield effective governmental power.” Id. at 1121; see also United States v. Ray, 690 F. Supp.
508, 511 (M.D. La. 1988) (“On its face, the Hobbs Act does not limit official right extortion to
‘public officers.’ ”).
125. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260–64 (1992).
126. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 875–76.
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could commit extortion at common law.127 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged Lindgren’s argument in a footnote in Evans: “At least one commenta-
tor has argued that, at common law, extortion under color of official right
could also be committed by a private individual.”128
Indeed, Lindgren extensively researched prosecutions of private citizens
for extortion at common law. He found that the majority of prosecutions at
common law were of public officials.129 But he noted that “on more occa-
sions than can be dismissed as aberrations, early courts prosecuted private
individuals for extortion.”130 If Congress adopted the common-law meaning
of the term “extortion,” it follows that private actors are included, as they
were at common law. The Supreme Court could have rendered a conclusion
on this but chose not to, indicating a willingness by the Court to at least
consider that private actors extort under color of official right. Thus, the text
of the statute suggests that private actors may extort under color of official
right.
B. Legislative History Supports the Application of the Hobbs Act
to Private Actors
The legislative history of the statute, while sparse, also supports the stat-
ute’s application to private citizens.131 Most of the floor debate around the
bill focused on the bill’s impact on organized labor, which meant that legis-
lators barely discussed the color-of-official-right theory.132 And the floor de-
bate that does exist is difficult to follow.133 What is clear, however, is that
Congress did not explicitly restrict the bill to public officials.134 Since the
legislative history is unclear,135 however, courts should not rely on it to as-
sume that only public officials can act under color of official right.
The origin of the statute suggests Congress did not intend to restrict
official-right extortion to public officials. Congress passed the Hobbs Act as
127. See id. at 875–82 for a discussion of extortion by private citizens at common law.
128. Evans, 504 U.S. at 264 n.13 (citing Lindgren, supra note 15, at 875).
129. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 876.
130. Id.
131. The Supreme Court often turns to legislative history when the text of the statute is
unclear. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998); Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995).
132. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978) (“The primary focus in the
Hobbs Act debates was on whether the bill was designed as an attack on organized labor.”).
133. See Curato et al., supra note 118, at 1058 (“The original intent of Congress regarding
who is ‘under color of official right’ is confusing”).
134. See infra notes 136–158 and accompanying text.
135. See Curato et al., supra note 118, at 1058 n.229 (“Although the court cases clearly
interpret the Hobbs Act to include extortion by a public official, the legislative history on this
point is not so clear.”).
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a successor to the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934136 in response to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v. Local 807 of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters.137 The Hobbs Act replaced language about the use of force
or threats in the Anti-Racketeering Act with prohibitions against robbery
and extortion.138 Some of the new language about extortion came from a
proposed penal code known as the Field Code.139 Other areas of the new
statute borrowed language from a separate code, the Penal Code of New
York.140 The New York provision only applied official-right extortion to pub-
lic officials, but the Field Code provided that anyone could commit extor-
tion under color of official right.141 The eventual Hobbs Act mirrored the
language from the Field Code and omitted the language from the New York
code that limited official-right extortion to public officials.142
The statements of members of Congress at the time the bill passed also
demonstrate that the Act was not restricted to those with actual authority.
The sponsor of the bill, Congressman Samuel Hobbs, explained that actual
authority is not a requirement for conviction of extortion under color of
official right.143 During a debate about an early version of the bill,144 Con-
gressman Stephen Day moved to delete the official-right language, an
amendment that provoked “five minutes of confused and inconsistent de-
bate.”145 Day asked if color of official right would apply to an initiation fee
for a union.146 The exchange then went as follows:
Mr. HOBBS. Certainly not. “Color of official right” means absence of right
but pretended assertion of right.
136. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 107.
137. United States v. Local 807 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012), as recognized in Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537
U.S. 393 (2003); Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 107. Teamsters looking for work were
attacking farmers as they crossed into New York. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 889. This was not
considered extortion because the truckers were seeking wages, a loophole in the Anti-Racke-
teering Act. See id.
138. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978).
139. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 889–90.
140. Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 403 (2003).
141. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 899–900.
142. See id. at 899 (“Congress, however, did not enact the language of the New York
statute limiting extortion under color of official right to public officials.”); Jeremy N. Gayed,
Note, “Corruptly”: Why Corrupt State of Mind Is an Essential Element for Hobbs Act Extortion
Under Color of Official Right, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1731, 1757 (2003) (“The Field Code’s
definition of extortion is almost identical to the corresponding language in the Hobbs Act
extortion provision.”); see also Stern, supra note 61, at 12 (“While it is clear that the definition
of extortion contained in the Hobbs Act was similar to the New York statute, it is equally clear
that the Congress did not intend to rely solely on the New York law.” (footnotes omitted)).
143. 89 Cong. Rec. 3228–29 (1943).
144. The 1943 version of the bill passed the House but not the Senate. See United States v.
French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1073 n.4 (8th Cir. 1980).
145. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 890.
146. 89 Cong. Rec. 3228.
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Mr. DAY. I know; but what do the words “official right” mean?
Mr. HOBBS. The same thing.
Mr. DAY. It has not got to be by some authority?
Mr. HOBBS. In other words, you pretend to be a police officer, you pre-
tend to be a deputy sheriff, but you are not.
Mr. DAY. I think the change should be made that I have mentioned.
Mr. HOBBS. It could not possibly apply if there were any bona fide right; it
applies only to pretended right.147
Although Hobbs is likely referring to someone impersonating a public
official, the statement allows for a few inferences, based on Hobbs’s sponsor-
ship of the bill. First, Congress did not intend the Act to apply exclusively to
public officials. Otherwise, Hobbs’s example would not work—an actual
public official could not impersonate one. And second, Hobbs was not con-
cerned with the extortioner’s actual authority, but rather the impression of
authority that the extortioner created. Courts have largely ignored the signif-
icance of these statements when interpreting the Hobbs Act. Only a handful
of courts have considered them, and those that have do not afford them
much weight.148 The Seventh Circuit, for example, wrote that Hobbs’s state-
ment was not dispositive because it was “completely at odds with the ac-
cepted interpretation of the term both before and after the Hobbs Act was
enacted.”149 But the accepted interpretation of the term “under color of offi-
cial right” is hardly concrete,150 especially since prosecutors have only used
that particular prong of the statute since the 1970s.151
Even the floor debate about organized labor refutes the argument that
Congress intended any part of the Hobbs Act to apply only to certain indi-
viduals. For example, Congressman William Whittingon said the bill was to
prevent violence by members of labor unions against truck drivers: “It pun-
ishes extortion and robbery no matter by whom committed.”152 Similarly,
147. Id. at 3228–29. Professor Lindgren notes that this exchange provides further support
for the argument that the color of official right Hobbs Act language was taken from the Field
Code, which authorized extortion by private actors, rather than the New York Penal Code,
which did not. Lindgren, supra note 15, at 890.
Hobbs could not have been talking intelligently about New York law. If New York law
were intended, the one example Hobbs gave to illustrate official right extortion would
not have been official right extortion. . . .
. . . Only by taking this historical approach could Congress interpret the official right
language of the Hobbs Act as applying to private individuals as Congress obviously
thought it was doing.
Id. at 890–91.
148. E.g., French, 628 F.2d at 1073 n.4 (“The brief debate that occurred in 1943, however,
was not clear enough to be determinative of the scope of the ‘color of official right’ language
. . . .”).
149. United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 663 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009).
150. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
152. 91 Cong. Rec. 11,913 (1945).
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Congressman Raymond Springer noted that “there is nothing in this legisla-
tion which relates to labor. Labor is not mentioned in the bill. It applies to
every American citizen.”153 These statements suggest that the key players in-
volved in the passage of the Hobbs Act never intended the Act to treat sepa-
rate classes of people differently, regardless of whether the defendants were
members of labor unions or public officials. Although Congress did not fo-
cus on the color-of-official-right theory when voting on the bill, the bill’s
legislative history nonetheless proves ambiguous. Therefore, the legislative
history can reasonably be interpreted to show that the Hobbs Act applies not
only to public officials but to those acting under the pretense of public au-
thority as well.
C. The Supreme Court Construes the Hobbs Act Broadly
Finally, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that courts should inter-
pret the Hobbs Act broadly, which supports expanding its application to
private citizens.154 In United States v. Culbert, the Court considered whether
the fear prong of the Hobbs Act required the government to prove racketeer-
ing as an element, which would have imposed an additional burden on pros-
ecutors and limited the conduct that the Hobbs Act criminalizes.155 The
Court found that the legislative history and purpose of the statute indicated
that the Act should not be limited. Rather, the court concluded, the Act’s
language sweeps broadly, including “all persons who have . . . ‘affect[ed]
commerce . . . by robbery or extortion.’ ”156 The Court found that “the statu-
tory language and the legislative history of the Hobbs Act impels us to the
conclusion that Congress intended to make criminal all conduct within the
reach of the statutory language.”157
In other words, the Court declined to make it more difficult for prose-
cutors to charge the Hobbs Act, because the Hobbs Act is meant to apply
broadly. To be sure, Culbert is distinguishable because “racketeering” is not
in the Hobbs Act, whereas “extortion . . . under color of official right” is in
the text of the statute.158 Also, the Court was considering the extortion-by-
fear prong of the statute.159 Still, Culbert shows the Court generally encour-
ages a broad reading of the Hobbs Act. And lower courts that have extended
official-right extortion to non-elected officials have relied in part on this
case.160 The Ninth Circuit, for example, used it to hold that a non-elected
153. Id. at 11,911.
154. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 380 (1978).
155. Id. at 372.
156. Id. at 373 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976)).
157. Id. at 380; see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (“[The Hobbs]
Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Con-
gress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical
violence.”).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).
159. Culbert, 435 U.S. at 372.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1993).
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legislative aide could be charged with official-right extortion,161 while the
First Circuit upheld the conviction of a private citizen who aided and abet-
ted a public official in part based on Culbert.162
Congress intended the Hobbs Act to apply broadly, to sweep in a wide
array of criminal conduct—”all conduct within the reach of the statutory
language.”163 Based on the absence of the words “public official” in the stat-
ute, and the use of the word “color” to suggest a guise of—as opposed to
actual—authority, extortion by private officials falls “within the reach of the
statutory language.”164
Taken together, these factors indicate that courts should interpret the
Hobbs Act to apply to private citizens as well as public officials. The statute’s
plain language and legislative history, Congress’s  intent, and the Supreme
Court’s explicit instruction to interpret the Hobbs Act broadly, all make it
so, as a statutory matter, it is entirely consistent to apply the statute to pri-
vate officials who nevertheless sell the public trust.
III. The Reasonable-Impression Test Should Apply in All
Official-Right Extortion Cases
Private citizens who wield influence over public actions should be cov-
ered under the Hobbs Act, regardless of whether they are technically public
officials or not. The current practice of finding otherwise creates inconsis-
tent results, especially in cases in which both public officials and private
citizens create the false impression that they have the ability to influence a
government action but courts only uphold convictions for public officials.
Moreover, private citizens who solicit bribes in return for influencing gov-
ernment undermine the public’s faith in government just as much as a pub-
lic official’s doing so.
This Part argues that the test courts use to apply the Hobbs Act to pub-
lic officials who do not have actual authority to deliver the action they
promise is the same test that courts should apply to private citizens. Section
III.A discusses courts’ applications of a reasonable-impression test in cases
dealing with public officials, highlighting that public officials need not have
actual authority to be convicted under the Hobbs Act. Section III.B analyzes
courts’ applications of a similar reasonable-impression test in cases not in-
volving public officials. Section III.C concludes that, because both public
officials and private citizens can create the impression of influence regardless
of their actual authority, the same reasonable-impression test should apply
to each group.
161. Id.
162. United States v. Casiano, No. 93-1782, 1994 WL 283909, at *4 (1st Cir. June 24,
1994) (per curiam) (upholding conviction because the conduct “clearly fell within the relevant
statutory language”).
163. Culbert, 435 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
164. Id.
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A. Public Officials and the Reasonable-Impression Test
To be convicted of a Hobbs Act violation, a public official need not have
any actual authority to carry out the action he promises.165 In cases against
public officials, courts focus on the exploitation of the victim’s belief.166 If
the victim reasonably believes the public official has the ability to influence
the promised action, the public official is acting under color of official right,
regardless of his actual authority. “[T]he issue is whether the payer had a
reasonable belief about the official’s authority to engage in the promised
conduct and not the actual scope of the official’s authority.”167
This principle as applied to public officials stems from United States v.
Mazzei,168 a seminal Third Circuit case decided en banc. Every other circuit
has since adopted this principle.169 In Mazzei, a state senator accepted a bribe
to fix a state lease, which he had no actual authority to do. The Third Circuit
upheld his conviction, ruling that the jury only needed to find that the vic-
tim “held, and defendant exploited, a reasonable belief that the state system
so operated that the power in fact of defendant’s office included the effective
authority.”170
Examples of how the reasonable-impression test works in practice may
prove illuminating. The Sixth Circuit upheld a Hobbs Act conviction for a
defendant who offered to sell a copy of a licensing examination to two appli-
cants for $300.171 Although the defendant had no power to actually issue
such licenses, the court upheld his conviction because the applicants be-
lieved “they were in effect purchasing a broker’s license.”172 Likewise, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the color-of-official-right conviction of a county re-
corder of deeds in Indiana, who promised, among other things, to help an
FBI informant sign a Purge of Lien Notice for $400.173 Drafting Purge of
165. United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc).
166. See infra notes 169–170 and accompanying text; see also Henning & Radek, supra
note 28, at 119 (“The understanding of the victim is crucial when the defendant does not have
actual authority over the exercise of governmental authority but claims the ability to effectuate
a decision in favor of the payers in exchange for a payment.”).
167. Henning & Radek, supra note 28, at 119.
168. 521 F.2d 639.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The law is well
settled that an official need not have the de jure power to effectuate the end for which he
accepts or induces payment in order to be convicted under the Hobbs Act.”); United States v.
Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320 (10th Cir. 1976) (“[I]t is unnecessary that the accused have absolute
power to determine the issue. It is sufficient that it is within his jurisdiction (the scope of his
office) and that the victim has a reasonable belief that he does have the power.”); United States
v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 394 (1st Cir. 1976) (“The relevant question was whether [the
defendant] imparted and exploited a reasonable belief that he had effective influence over the
award of Authority contracts.”).
170. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 643.
171. Harding, 563 F.2d at 301, 307.
172. Id. at 307.
173. United States v. Carter, 530 F.3d 565, 567–69, 574–75 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Lien Notices was not an actual part of the recorder’s job duties.174 But the
court found that whether the acts fell within the Recorder of Deeds’s re-
sponsibilities in fact was “irrelevant”175 because the victim “reasonably be-
lieved that [the defendant] could deliver these items based on his
position.”176
Courts have expanded this principle to cover influence over official ac-
tion. That is, if the victim knows the person accepting the payment does not
have effective authority, but believes the person can merely influence an offi-
cial action, the victim’s belief in the public official’s mere influence is suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act.177 The Third Circuit, for
example, upheld the conviction of a mayor who accepted a bribe to affect a
school board contract.178 The victim knew the mayor had no actual author-
ity over the school board. But the victim believed that the mayor could in-
fluence the school board, and this belief was enough to sustain the mayor’s
conviction.179 The court explained:
[W]here a public official has, and agrees to wield, influence over a govern-
mental decision in exchange for financial gain, or where the official’s posi-
tion could permit such influence, and the victim of an extortion scheme
reasonably believes that the public official wields such influence, that is suf-
ficient to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, regardless of whether
the official holds any de jure or de facto power over the decision.180
The victim’s reasonable belief of mere influence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the Hobbs Act.181 The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
have also expanded the Mazzei test in this way.182
174. Id. at 574.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 575.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Bencivengo, 749 F.3d 205, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 236 (2014).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 212.
180. Id. at 212–13.
181. Id.; see also United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We will
uphold a conviction for Hobbs Act extortion where the evidence indicates (1) that the payor
made a payment to the defendant because the payor held a reasonable belief that the defendant
would perform official acts in return, and (2) that the defendant knew the payor made the
payment because of that belief.”).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793, 795–96 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding
conviction of a county commissioner who accepted $25,000 from an undercover FBI agent to
enact a city zoning change because, although he did not have actual authority over the city
zoning board, he had “influence and authority over a means to that end”); United States v.
Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 135–36 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the conviction of a court police
officer who accepted bribes from an FBI agent to influence judicial decisions, because a jury
could have found that the agent reasonably believed the officer could influence judicial deci-
sions); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1119, 1128 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding convic-
tion of state senator who accepted bribes for brokering a county contract because he said he
had “influence” in that county).
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B. Private Actors and the Reasonable-Impression Test
Courts have adopted some of this logic in analyzing cases dealing with
private citizens. For example, when the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction
of the California legislative aid, the court actually applied the reasonable-
impression test to public employees: “[W]e conclude that the Hobbs Act
reaches those public employees who may lack the actual power to bring
about official action, but create the reasonable impression that they do pos-
sess such power and seek to exploit that impression to induce payments.”183
Some courts have applied the reasonable-impression test without explic-
itly adopting the standard. The Fifth Circuit, for example, upheld a convic-
tion for a bail bondsman who extorted a bribe from a motorist.184 The bail
bondsman was also a town alderman.185 The court concluded that because
the driver believed the bail bondsman could fix his ticket, the bail bondsman
was acting under color of official right.186 The court based its decision on the
victim’s belief, not on the bail bondsman’s status in fact as a public
official.187
In clearer terms than other district courts, the Northern District of Illi-
nois explicitly adopted the reasonable-impression test for private individu-
als.188 In United States v. Phillips, a private attorney, who was appointed
guardian ad litem and later as trustee in a state court matter, told another
attorney that a decision favorable to his client could be obtained for
$10,000.189 He was indicted for attempted extortion under color of official
right and moved to dismiss the indictment.190
The Phillips court examined the text, legislative history, and legislative
intent of the Act. The court wrote that on its face, the Hobbs Act does not
contain class limitations—rather it applies to “whoever” affects commerce
by extortion, a broad phrasing.191 On the legislative history, the court noted
that another statute in effect at the time Congress passed the Hobbs Act
prohibited extortion under color of office by federal employees acting under
their office, “or under color of his pretended or assumed office.”192 This dem-
onstrates, the court wrote, that Congress had already recognized that a pri-
vate person could commit extortion under color of official right.193
183. United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1993).
184. United States v. Stephens, 964 F.2d 424, 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1992).
185. Id. at 429.
186. Id. at 430.
187. Id.
188. See United States v. Phillips, 586 F. Supp. 1118, 1122–23 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
189. Id. at 1119.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1120–21.
192. Id. at 1121 (quoting Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3574, § 5481, 34 Stat. 546).
193. Id.
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Addressing the common-law argument, the court wrote that Congress in-
tended the Hobbs Act to apply more broadly than the common law.194 From
a legislative history perspective, “[t]he statute’s legislative sponsors repeat-
edly emphasized that the purpose of the bill was to punish all forms of
extortive conduct which affected commerce in any way.”195 Ultimately, the
Phillips court wrote that the test should be “whether the extortion victim
reasonably believed that the defendant was in a position to wield govern-
mental power to the victim’s detriment.”196 The court rejected any “public
official-private citizen distinction.”197
Other district courts have also used the reasonable-impression test to
uphold convictions of private citizens. The Middle District of Pennsylvania
used the reasonable-impression test when defendants argued that the gov-
ernment had failed to prove they were members of a school board.198 The
court wrote that there was still evidence to convict them under color of
official right because the victim thought the defendants could secure the
contract.199 In other words, the defendants’ status as public officials was ir-
relevant, as long as the victims believed in the defendants’ influence.200 Like-
wise, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied this test to a private
citizen, a former tax assessor, who continued to take bribes after leaving
office.201 The government needed to prove only that the victim “reasonably
believed” the former public employee had the ability.202 The court explained
that “[t]he issue does not turn on the present official status of the defendant
or whether he has the de jure power to carry out his extortion plan.”203
Although the majority of courts that have considered this issue have
opted not to apply the Hobbs Act to private citizens, a handful of courts
have applied the reasonable-impression test to private citizens. These cases
add further support to the application of the Hobbs Act to private citizens.
C. The Public/Private Distinction Leads to Logical Inconsistency
This Subsection considers counterarguments, but concludes that the
logic of the reasonable-impression test should explicitly animate all Hobbs
Act color-of-official-right cases. The common theme in these cases is not
that a public official had authority in fact, but that the victim believed the
194. Id. The case was decided in 1984, pre-Evans.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1122; see also id. at 1123.
197. Id. at 1122.
198. See United States v. Barna, 442 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See United States v. Furey, 491 F. Supp. 1048, 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1067.
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person could take—or even influence—an official action.204 Since both pub-
lic officials and private citizens can create the impression of influence, the
test should be universal regardless of actual authority.
Some might argue that reading the Hobbs Act broadly would implicate
lobbyists, who essentially accept money from clients in return for influence
over government officials. But several factors distinguish lobbying from ex-
tortion and bribery. First, lobbyists advocate for legislators to take actions
that are legal, such as changing the laws through the legislative process.205  By
contrast, consider violators of the Hobbs Act: public officials who try to
deliver permits,206 steer contracts,207 and deliver licenses to those who have
not earned them.208 In all of these examples, the extortioner is promising
improper government action—as Lindgren puts it, extorting a “corrupt pay-
ment.”209 Also, lobbying is regulated210 and thus is at least somewhat trans-
parent, whereas extortion is, of course, not.
Also, courts have read a quid pro quo requirement into the Hobbs Act.
In McCormick v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when the pay-
ment at issue is a campaign contribution, there must be a quid pro quo,
meaning the public official must make an “explicit promise or undertaking”
to perform or not perform an official act.211 It is unclear whether the Court
intended a quid pro quo requirement to apply to cases outside of campaign
contributions, but many courts have interpreted McCormick as requiring a
quid pro quo in all official-right extortion cases.212 And the Evans Court
described a similar quid pro quo, noting that the Hobbs Act covers a public
official who “has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing
that the payment was made in return for official acts.”213 Thus a lobbyist’s
conduct would only fall under the Hobbs Act, even under the reasonable-
204. See supra notes 165–182 and accompanying text.
205. Bård Harstad & Jakob Svensson, Bribes, Lobbying, and Development, 105 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 46, 46 (2011) (“We define lobbying, taking the form of campaign contributions or
influence-buying through other means, as an activity that is aimed at changing existing rules or
policies. We view bribery, in contrast, as an attempt to bend or get around existing rules or
policies.”); see also Michael Maiello, Corruption, American Style, Forbes (Jan. 22, 2009, 6:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/22/corruption-lobbying-bribes-biz-corruption09-cx_
mm_0122maiello.html [http://perma.cc/KV3T-DBTV] (“A briber wants a [sic] to circumvent
the law. A lobbyist wants to change it.”).
206. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 78, 95–96, 178 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
209. James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction,
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1695, 1696 (1993) (“Historically, extortion under color of office is the
seeking or receipt of a corrupt payment by a public official (or a pretended public official)
because of his office or his ability to influence official action.”).
210. Harstad & Svensson, supra note 205, at 46.
211. 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
212. Strader, supra note 16, at 171.
213. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
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impression test, if the lobbyist made an explicit promise to deliver an im-
proper government action in return for a payment.214
Moreover, some courts argue that public officials and private citizens
should be treated differently because the misuse of office in and of itself
satisfies the element of coercion.215 The Seventh Circuit, for example, wrote
that public officials have a special brand of criminal liability because victims
are especially vulnerable to those holding public office.216 But this distinc-
tion does not hold up under the reasonable-impression test, which univer-
sally animates courts’ jurisprudence on public-official cases.217 If the victim
believes the extortioner has the ability to influence official action, the rea-
sonable-impression test is satisfied. In private-citizen cases, the victim either
thinks the extortioner is a public official,218 or believes that the extortioner
can influence official action.219 The effect on the victim is the same. Moreo-
ver, the effect on society is the same—in both cases, the public loses faith in
government because it believes official results are for sale.
These arguments against expanding the Hobbs Act are outweighed by a
simple fact: the judge-created distinction between private actors and public
officials leads to inconsistency in the law for similarly culpable actors. For
example, on the public official side, the New Jersey mayor had no authority
over the school board but was convicted under the Hobbs Act.220 The legisla-
tive aide in California had no power over legislation but created the reasona-
ble impression that he could move a bill to the governor’s desk.221 The
executive director of the real estate board had no power to issue licenses but
was convicted, because the victims thought they were buying a real estate
license.222 And the Indiana official who had no power over Purge of Lien
Notices was convicted because his victim reasonably believed he could
deliver.223
Yet Monte McFall, who also wielded influence over a public official—his
friend—was not convicted. Likewise, in Tomblin, the businessman who pur-
ported to influence a U.S. Senator in return for $250,000 was not convicted
214. Of course, there are some who believe that lobbying is the same as bribery. E.g.,
Maiello, supra note 205 (statement of former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich) (“What’s the
real difference between me bribing a customs agent so that I can bring a banned substance into
the country or me contributing money to a senator and then cajoling him into making the
substance legal for import? . . . Frankly, I don’t see much difference.”).
215. See e.g., United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 65 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1976)).
216. United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2009).
217. See supra notes 165–182 and accompanying text.
218. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 661.
219. See, e.g., id. at 664; United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1383 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822,
830 (7th Cir. 1991).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 177–181.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 100–102.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 171–172.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 173–176.
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of extortion because he only wielded “unofficial power.”224 And in the Sev-
enth Circuit, a private individual who “colorfully boasted” about his influ-
ence over public officials was not convicted of official-right extortion.225
In all of these examples, the defendant lacked actual authority over the
action he accepted money to undertake. The defendants all created, and ex-
ploited, their victims’ beliefs that public officials or actions could be bought.
Yet courts upheld some of these convictions and not others. The only dis-
tinction is that some are public officials or employees and some are not.
Conclusion
When courts interpret the Hobbs Act, they require individuals acting
under the “color of official right” to be public officials, or have aided and
abetted public officials. But this restriction does not appear in either the text
or history of the Hobbs Act. As a result of this loophole, private individuals
who leverage their influence over government officials and actions escape
punishment for extortion. To solve this problem, courts should interpret the
Hobbs Act broadly and expand the reasonable-impression test to explicitly
include private citizens.
Federal prosecutors should be able to wield the Hobbs Act against any
person who creates and exploits the belief that he has the ability to influence
official action. Regardless of the person’s status as a public official or private
sidekick, that person is acting under the guise of official right and should be
charged accordingly.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
